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The Role of Workfare in Striking a Balance 
between Incentives and Insurance 





Workfare policies are often introduced in labour market policies to improve the trade-off 
between incentives and insurance as an alternative to benefit reductions. Most of the debate 
on such policies has focussed on the direct effect of those participating in the scheme, and in 
particular the possible locking-in effect reducing job search. In a general equilibrium search 
framework, we show that the effects of workfare policies critically depend on the response of 
those not in the programme when they take into account that workfare is a condition for 
remaining eligible for unemployment benefits. This implies that unemployed not yet in 
workfare may search more for regular jobs, and employed may accept lower wages since the 
outside option becomes less attractive. Introduction of workfare policies into an 
unemployment insurance scheme is shown to contribute to a reduction in both open and total 
unemployment. It is also shown that the direct search effects of workfare policies are a poor 
indicator of the overall effect workfare policies have on labour market policies. 
JEL Code: J68. 
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Europe". 1 Introduction
A key policy challenge is to ensure a proper balance between incentives and insurance in
the labour market. The incentive part is related to active job search including reallocation
across jobs, skills and geographical dimensions to make the labour market ﬂexible and
able to cope with shocks and structural changes, ensuring a low and stable unemployment
rate. The insurance part is related to the risk associated with loss of jobs and incomes
carried by individuals. The challenge is to ensure both incentives and insurance so as to
combine economy wide demands to the labour market with individual desires for security.
The issue of how to strike a balance between incentives and insurance in the labour
market has recently been much discussed under the heading of ﬂexicurity, which alludes
to the possibility of having ﬂexible rules for hiring and ﬁring of workers in combination
with a generous unemployment insurance scheme coping with individual risks associated
with labour market ﬂexibility. Denmark is often portrayed as a model example of a
ﬂexicurity system with very ﬂexible ﬁring rules and a generous unemployment insurance
system. Since the unemployment rate in Denmark is relatively low, this has been taken to
illustrate the possibility of striking a balance between incentives and insurance. However,
in accounting for the Danish experience, it is important also to take into account the role
of active labour market policies in the form of workfare elements. Both the rather ﬂexible
dismissal rules and the unemployment insurance (and social assistance) system have been
virtually unchanged for many years, and were also in place during the period from the
mid 1970s to the early 1990s with double digit unemployment rates. The major changes
in Denmark in recent years are a sequence of reforms1 during the 1990s and continued
in recent years which has strengthened the third pillar of Danish labour market policy,
namely the active labour market policy where workfare elements have come to play an
important role (for details see e.g. Andersen and Svarer (2007)).
The role of workfare in striking a balance between incentives and insurance is thus
an important policy issue. The emphasis on active labour market policies is, however,
1The main orientation of the reform is a shift from a passive orientation of the system focusing on
income maintenance to an active focus on ensuring employment. Important policy changes include i) a
strengthening of workfare elements in both the unemployment beneﬁt and social assistance scheme, ii)
eliminating participation in activation measures as a possibility to renew eligibility for unemployment
beneﬁts, iii) shortening of the eﬀective duration of beneﬁts. In short, this can be interpreted as strength-
ening the incentive side while maintaining a reasonable level of insurance (without reducing beneﬁts), see
Andersen and Svarer (2007).
2not a new phenomenon, and various elements can be found in the labour market policies
implemented in many countries. The experience with active labour market policies is
rather mixed. A large number of empirical analyses of various elements of active labour
market policies exists, but they leave a rather unclear message. In a recent survey, Kluve
(2006) concludes that there are some positive eﬀects of private job creation programmes
and measures aiming at enhancing job search eﬃciency, whereas training programmes and
public sector employment are less eﬃcient instruments which may even have a negative
eﬀect on employment. However, most of these analyses are partial in nature, focussing on
the direct eﬀects of various policy measures neither taking into account the general equi-
librium eﬀects (wage responses, search incentives for other groups, employment creation
etc.) nor the ﬁnancing of active labour market policies. However, partial equilibrium rea-
soning may provide a distorted picture of the overall eﬀects of given policies. There is thus
a need to clarify in a general equilibrium setting which elements of active labour market
policies that can be used to mitigate the trade-oﬀ between insurance and incentives.
Most analyses of workfare focus on the direct eﬀect of the programme; that is, the
potential of the programme to improve qualiﬁcations, and thus re-employment possibili-
ties, and the locking-in eﬀect arising from programme participation tending to reduce job
search2. However, in a labour market with ﬂows in and out of unemployment, the intro-
duction of workfare programmes will aﬀect not only those participating but also others
anticipating that they may eventually if unemployed end up in a workfare programme.
Thus, both unemployed (not in activation) and employed are aﬀected. The search eﬀort
of the unemployed may increase to reduce the risk of ending up in workfare (being less
attractive than passively receiving beneﬁts). It follows that that overall job search is
aﬀected by two counteracting eﬀects, namely the negative locking-in eﬀect for those in
workfare and the positive threat or motivation eﬀect for the unemployed. Moreover, and
less obvious, even the direct eﬀect of workfare on total search eﬀort is not pivotal since
there is also a wage eﬀect. This wage eﬀect arises because workfare aﬀects the outside
option of employed workers; that is, the outside option deteriorates, and this tends to
lead to wage moderation. Wage moderation boosts job creation, which, in turn, will con-
tribute to increase employment (matching) in the labour market. Therefore, the direct
eﬀect of workfare policies on programme participants may be a poor indicator of how such
2Subsequent job search may also be aﬀected. It is possible that participants will search more actively
since they will perceive the chances of ﬁnding a job to have improved. Oppositely, the types of jobs
searched may be narrowed to the extent that the individual tries to match jobs to speciﬁc training.
3policies aﬀect labour market performance. This paper aims at clarifying the joint eﬀect of
workfare policies on search and job creation, and thus overall labour market performance.
The contribution of this paper is to consider how workfare as an element of an unem-
ployment beneﬁt scheme can be an instrument in striking a balance between considerations
for incentives and insurance. Speciﬁcally, we analyse whether introduction of workfare
policies can improve labour market performance for given beneﬁts. We present a general
equilibrium analysis of workfare in a basic search framework3. A tax ﬁnanced unemploy-
ment insurance scheme deals with the insurance aspect, but may for well-known reasons
create incentive problems inducing insuﬃcient job search on the part of the unemployed.
To focus on the search and job creation eﬀects, we disregard human capital considera-
tions; that is, human capital is assumed not to depreciate over the unemployment spell
(see Pavoni and Violanti (2007)), and workfare programmes do not aﬀect human capital
(reemployment probabilities are the same for unemployed and programme participants).
Notice also that workfare policies have two dimensions, namely the transition rate
from unemployment to activation and the work requirement. The two are not in general
equivalent, and therefore the composition of workfare policies are of importance for search
eﬀort and wage determination, and thus unemployment. It is an implication that changes
in beneﬁts and workfare policies are not equivalent even from a utility perspective in a
search environment, and therefore this policy tool may critically aﬀect the incentive and
insurance trade-oﬀ.
We consider these mechanisms both analytically and in numerical simulations. The
key issue addressed is the eﬀects of workfare requirements on search eﬀort undertaken by
diﬀerent groups in the labour market, and their eﬀects on total search eﬀort and wage
determination and therefore on the overall unemployment rate (open and total). We
consider the distributional consequences in terms of the fraction of workers in diﬀerent
states (employment, beneﬁts, and workfare) and their income and utility levels.
This paper contributes to the theoretical literature on workfare policies. Besley and
Coate (1992, 1995) pointed out that workfare can be used as a screening device and there-
fore allows a better targeting of income transfers. This eﬀect of workfare policies has been
further analysed by e.g. Chambers (1989) and Betts (1998). In a labour market context,
Kreiner and Tranæs (2005) analyse workfare as a screening device aﬀecting the optimal
unemployment insurance oﬀered for a given unemployment risk. Frederiksson and Holm-
lund (2006) compare workfare policies with time limits and sanctions in an unemployment
3See Kolm and Tonin (2007) for an analysis of the eﬀects of in-work beneﬁts in a similar framework.
4insurance scheme and argue that workfare does not improve search incentives but may
hamper them by being time consuming (the locking-in eﬀect). Hence, they argue that
workfare is dominated by time limits and monitoring of search. However, Holzner, Meier
and Werding (2006) ﬁnd in an eﬃciency wage model that workfare may lessen the non-
shirking condition since unemployment beneﬁts become less attractive, and this, in turn,
shifts the wage curve.
An important question from a normative perspective is whether there is any ratio-
nale for introducing workfare policies or whether these policies are dominated by other
policy measures like beneﬁt cuts. In the literature on income redistribution programmes,
it is a general ﬁnding that workfare as such does not leave more leverage in balancing
incentives and redistribution (insurance) since a change in beneﬁts or work requirements
would work via changing the utility oﬀered to people receiving transfers. Therefore, under
a standard utility metric, workfare does not play a large role as part of optimal policies45.
The situation changes if the policy objective is cast in terms of income or consumption
possibilities (income maintenance) rather than utility since workfare in this case can be
used to strengthen incentives for given beneﬁt or income levels, see Besley and Coate
(1992, 1995). It is reasonable to argue that distributional discussions usually focus on
income, and therefore workfare may create an extra degree of freedom in redistribution
policies. Moreover, income is interpersonally comparable, which utility is not. An alter-
native justiﬁcation may be given in terms of desert-sensitive altruism (for a deﬁnition see
e.g. Luttens and Valfort (2007)) implying that "hard working" individuals will oppose
contributing to redistribution towards the "lazy"; i.e. the political support for generous
unemployment schemes may be higher if it is associated with workfare elements. This is
also related to work norms often permeating policy discussions. In any case, the primary
objective of the present paper is to present a positive analysis of how workfare policies
aﬀect labour market performance, in particular open and total unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the basic model and considers the
three eﬀects of workfare, i.e. the locking-in eﬀect, the threat eﬀect, and the wage eﬀect.
The overall eﬀects of the two dimensions of workfare (intensity and work requirement) are
worked out in section 3, and section 4 provides a numerical illustration of how workfare
4It has been shown that this equivalence result need not hold if workfare activities are productive
(Chambers (1989) and Betts (1998)).
5Kreiner and Tranæs (2005) show in an unemployment insurance context with an adverse selection
problem that it is Pareto-improving to introduce workfare.
5policies aﬀect labour market performance. Finally, section 5 oﬀers a few concluding
remarks and discusses the empirical evidence on the mechanisms analysed in the paper
as well as possible extensions of the framework.
2 A search model with workfare
This section develops a very stylized search model6 to bring forth some basic eﬀects of
workfare as an instrument in labour market policies. Agents are homogeneous but diﬀer
in their labour market status, and frictions are associated with transition between labour
market states.
2.1 Workers
Consider a labour market regime in which unemployed are entitled to a beneﬁt b when un-
employed. Unemployed persons may be required to participate in activation programmes
to remain eligible for the beneﬁt. The activation requirement may either be imposed
after having claimed unemployment beneﬁts for a certain period of time or at the discre-
tion of the labour market authorities. As argued by Frederiksson and Holmlund (2006),
a ﬁxed time duration can be approximated by a system in which there is a stochastic
transition from passive beneﬁts to workfare. A scheme where the activation (duration
and type of activity) is decided at the discretion of the authorities would thus, seen from
an individual perspective, be a stochastic workfare scheme. The probability that an un-
employed is required to participate in activation7 with a work requirement la is denoted
pau (0 ≤ pau ≤ 1). These two dimensions of workfare (la,pau) are exogenous policy
instruments.
Agents search for jobs with intensity su when unemployed, and sa when in activation.
The wage rate is denoted w, the tax rate τ, and the work requirement le (exogenous).
Unemployed are entitled (possible contingent on participation in a workfare programme)
to a beneﬁt b. The instantaneous utility depends on consumption (= disposable income)
and leisure (Fi = 1 − li − si, where the time endowment has been normalized to unity, l
denotes time worked, and s time spent searching for jobs), i.e.
6The model structure is closely related to Frederiksson and Holmlund (2006).
7As modelled, here transition from activation is only to employment. One could think of transition
to either ordinary unemployment beneﬁts or social assistance (lower compensation level). Adding these
features would not change anything qualitatively.
6h(w[1 − τ],1 − le) if employed
g(b,1 − su) if receiving unemployment beneﬁts
g(b,1 − sa − la) if in activation programme
where both h and g are increasing and concave functions in their arguments. We
allow the utility functions to diﬀer between employed and unemployed workers to capture
eventual stigmatization eﬀects of being without a regular job8.
Assuming a constant interest rate ρ, it follows that the value functions (in Steady
State) associated with the three labour market states are
ρV

























where job oﬀers arrive with probability αsu for unemployed, and αsa for workers in activa-
tion programmes. α is the job arrival rate conditional on search, and it is endogenous, see
below. Note that the employment probabilities are the same for the two groups, provided
they exert the same search eﬀort. Hence, there are no human capital diﬀerences between
the two groups nor any change in human capital from participating in activation9. There
is an exogenous job separation rate pue (0 < pue < 1).
From (1), (2) and (3), we have that the value functions for the three labour market
states can be written as
[ρ + pue]V
E = h(w[1 − τ],1 − le) + pueV
U
[ρ + αsu + pau]V




A = g(b,1 − sa − la) + αsaV
E









ρ + αsu + pau
V
A <   V
U (4)
8None of the analytical results depend on this assumption.
9These human capital eﬀects may be either positive via forms of training or maintenance of human
and social capital, or negative in terms of duration dependent depreciation of these.
7where   V U is the pay-oﬀ to unemployed in the absence of activation (pau = 0) given as
  V
U =
g(b,1 − su) + αsuV E
(ρ + αsu)
The pay-oﬀ as unemployed (4) is thus a convex combination of the pay-oﬀs in the absence
of activation and under activation. Hence, workfare can be interpreted as a randomized
sanction in the unemployment insurance scheme in the sense that with probability pau
the individual is required to participate in activation to remain eligible for beneﬁts.





and that the pay-oﬀ for those in activation is non-negative
V
A ≥ 0




A > 0 for pau > 0, la > 0
It is obvious that activation requirements (la > 0) worsen the situation for those in
activation. However, and this is crucial, it also aﬀects the position as unemployed since
there is possible transition into activation (the threat eﬀect), cf. (5) below. A change in
the transition rate from unemployment into activation does not directly aﬀect those in
activation, but it has an eﬀect on the unemployed in terms of increasing the likelihood of
changing status from being unemployed to being in activation, cf. (5).
∂V A
∂la = −g′
















A key question for policy design is whether workfare elements can release any incentive
eﬀects diﬀerent from a beneﬁt reduction, cf. the introduction. Although there, from a
utility perspective, is equivalence between beneﬁt reductions and workfare elements, the
eﬀects will diﬀer across the three groups in the labour market: employed, unemployed and
activated. This is so for two reasons. First, although a reduction in beneﬁts would aﬀect
unemployed and activated in similar ways, this is not the case for workfare policies. The
reason is that workfare has no direct eﬀect on the instantaneous utility for the unemployed
8(g(b,1−su)) but a prospective eﬀect via the risk of ending up in activation (the threat or
motivation eﬀect). Hence, changes in workfare demands (la) and beneﬁts (b) would not
have similar eﬀects for the two groups, see below. Secondly, beneﬁt changes and workfare
requirements aﬀect search incentives diﬀerently. The reason is that workfare requirement
aﬀects the marginal cost of search directly, whereas beneﬁts have an eﬀect via an income
eﬀect (see below).
The above suggests that the incentive eﬀects of changing the incidence of workfare (pau)
and the activity requirement (la) diﬀer between the unemployed and those in activation
programmes. To see the diﬀerence, consider the marginal rate of substitution of the two
instruments for given pay-oﬀ gains (V E − V U and V E − V A) and search eﬀort (su and
sa). As shown in the appendix B, we have that
dpau
dla






F(b,1 − sa − la)
V U − V A < 0
dpau
dla
       
A
=
ρ + pue + pau + αsu
pue
g′
F(b,1 − sa − la)
V U − V A > 0
which gives the marginal rate of substitution between the transition rate and the workfare
requirement for the unemployed and those on workfare, respectively. The intuition for
the negative rate of substitution for unemployed is straightforward; increasing the work
requirement makes the state of unemployment less attractive due to the possibility of
being transferred to activation, and this can be compensated by a lower incidence of
activation. Therefore, for the unemployed, the two instruments are substitutes. For those
in activation, the situation is diﬀerent. A higher work requirement would aﬀect utility
negatively, and for the utility diﬀerences to be unchanged the state of employment has
to be less attractive which is the case (due to the risk of job loss) if unemployment is
more likely to lead to activation, i.e. pau is higher. Hence, for those on workfare, the two
instruments are complements. It is also seen that for both types, the marginal rate of
substitution depends both on the incidence of workfare (pau) and the work requirement
(la), suggesting that there may be non-linearities in the eﬀects of the two dimensions.
92.2 Search eﬀort
Individuals choose search eﬀort taking all macro variables (w,τ,α) as given, and hence
the search eﬀort is determined by10
g
′














The LHS gives the marginal costs of search and the RHS the marginal gain as the product
of the job ﬁnding probability α and the utility gain from shifting from the current state
into employment.
Since V U − V A > 0, it follows that
g
′




su < sa + la
i.e. those in activation spend more time in total (activation plus search) than the
unemployed (search only), but it is in general ambiguous whether search activity is highest
for the unemployed or those in activation (sa ⋚ su).
An important question is whether workers in activation would search less than other
unemployed workers. This is the so-called locking-in eﬀect. It follows from (7) that no
unambiguous statements can be made due to two counteracting eﬀects. First, activation
is time consuming, and this tends to increase the marginal costs of search and therefore to
lower search eﬀort. Second, activation requirements make activation less attractive than
unemployment (V U − V A > 0), and therefore workers in activation have more to gain
by becoming employed, which tends to make them search more. Hence, in general it is
ambiguous whether there is a locking-in eﬀect. Unemployed and those in activation also

















F(1 − sa + la)
∂α
 
V E − V A 
∂la
− 1 ⋚ 0 (9)
10The second order conditions are fulﬁlled given the concavity of the g-function.
10Strengthening the work requirement induces the unemployed to exert more search eﬀort
since it increases the marginal gain from becoming employed (
∂α[V E−V U]
∂la > 0). A similar
eﬀect is present for those in activation, but it is counteracted by the extra time spent in
activation. Hence, it is possible that strengthened activation requirements may increase
the search eﬀort of unemployed - a threat eﬀect - while decreasing the search eﬀort of those
in activation - a locking-in eﬀect. The overall eﬀect on search is therefore ambiguous.
For the incidence or risk of being on workfare (pue), we also ﬁnd a diﬀerence in how


















F(b,1 − sa + la)
∂α
 
V E − V A 
∂pau
< 0 (11)
i.e. a large risk of transiting into activation induces the unemployed to search more for
jobs because the alternative is now less attractive. Oppositely, the search eﬀort of those
already in activation decreases since getting a job becomes less attractive (due to the risk
of losing it again and ending up in activation).
2.3 Matching
Hiring and transitions into employment are determined via a matching mechanism given
as
m(s,v)
where s denotes eﬀective search and v the vacant jobs (see below)11. The matching
function is assumed to be increasing in both arguments and to display constant returns.
Eﬀective or total search is determined by
s = suu + saa
where u is the fraction of the population being on unemployment beneﬁts, and a is





11Expressed in per capita terms, i.e the population is N = E + U + A, and e = E/N,u = U/N, and
a = A/N.
11where θ = v




−1,1), q′(θ) < 0.
Inﬂow and outﬂow into jobs balance in equilibrium, i.e.
[1 − u − a]pue = α[suu + saa] (12)
as they also do for activation, i.e.
αsaa = pauu (13)
2.4 Firms and vacancies
An employed worker produces an output y, while the cost of having an unﬁlled vacancy
is ky (k > 0). The value functions are
ρJ




E = y − w + pue(J
V − J
E)
Vacancies are created up to the point where (free entry) JV = 0, implying the following
relationship between the wage rate (w) and labour market tightness (θ)
w =
 





This gives a relation implying that the higher the wage rate (w), the higher the rate
at which ﬁrms are ﬁlling jobs (q(θ)); i.e. a high wage is associated with a low θ and thus
less job creation (fewer vacancies relative to total search eﬀort). Note for later reference
that this implies that the job ﬁnding rate α is decreasing in the wage rate. The value of





























hw(w[1 − τ],1 − le)
V E − V U + (1 − β)
−1
JE = 0 (15)
and the second-order condition is
∂Ψ(w,τ,V E − V U,q)
∂w
< 0
Workfare releases a wage eﬀect. To see this note that
∂Ψ(w,τ,V E − V U,q)
∂pau
= −β
hw(w[1 − τ],1 − le)




V E − V U 
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< 0
∂Ψ(w,τ,V E − V U,q)
∂la
≡ −β
hw(w[1 − τ],1 − le)
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i.e. an increase in both the intensity and work requirement of workfare tends to lower
the wage rate. In other words, both of these changes worsen the outside option of the
employed in wage negotiations and therefore tend to reduce the wage rate. A lower wage
tends to make ﬁrms create more vacancies, which, in turn, improves matches etc. The
wage eﬀect of workfare may thus be important on par with the direct search eﬀect.
2.6 Public sector
The policy instruments of the government are the beneﬁt level (b), the incidence of work-
fare (pau), the work requirement (la) and the tax rate τ. The budget constraint for the
public sector is
τw(1 − u − a) = bu + (b + c)a + r
where c is the cost of activation programmes12, and r other expenditure requirements of
the government. We take the tax rate to be given, and therefore the expenditure level r
is endogenous.13
It is shown in Appendix D that the model has a well-deﬁned equilibrium, and condi-
tions ensuring a unique equilibrium are given14
12To the extent that activation programmes result in some output, c could be interpreted as the net
costs.
13This assumption is made in the theoretical analysis to eliminate a non-linearity which would arise if
r is taken to be exogenous and τ endogenous.
14Multiple equilibria cannot be ruled out due to the non-linearities in the model. Potentially, there
133 Workfare policies and labour market policies
Our main interest is to explore how workfare policies can aﬀect labour market perfor-
mance, in particular open (u) and total (u + a) unemployment. The eﬀects of the two
dimensions of workfare (z = la,pau) on unemployment (u), activation (a) and total un-



























∂z − [pue + αsu + pau]a∂αsa
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(pue + αsu) +
pue+αsa
αsa pau
This expression allows us to decompose the changes in the three measures of labour
market performance in terms of the eﬀects arising from changes in the transition rate
into activation (
∂pau
∂z ), and the eﬀective search while unemployed(∂αsu
∂z ) and in activation
(∂αsa
∂z ). Considering ﬁrst the eﬀect released if the incidence of workfare is aﬀected (
∂pau
∂z )
(the ﬁrst term on the RHS of the expressions above). If
∂pau
∂z > 0, the transition from
passive to active beneﬁts is increased, which tends to lower open unemployment (∂u
∂z < 0),
but it increases activation (∂a
∂z > 0), and hence the net-eﬀect on total unemployment
is ambiguous (
∂(u+a)
∂z ⋚ 0). If the change increases the eﬀective job search rate for the
unemployment ∂αsu
∂z > 0, this contributes to lower unemployment (∂u
∂z < 0) and activation
(∂a
∂z < 0) since fewer will be transferred to activation, and this eﬀect thus unambiguously
works to lower total unemployment (
∂(u+a)
∂z < 0). If the eﬀective job-ﬁnding rate for
those in activation increases ∂αsa
∂z > 0, it will tend to increase open unemployment (total
employment goes up and there will be more job separations) (∂u
∂z > 0), but activation falls
(∂a
∂z < 0), and this eﬀect dominates such that total unemployment decreases (
∂(u+a)
∂z < 0).
The above suggests that the eﬀects of workfare policies on labour market performance
may be non-monotone.
The ﬁndings reported here indicate both that the eﬀects of workfare policies on open
unemployment, activation and total unemployment are complicated and that the net-
could be multiple equilibria in the sense of having e.g. an equilibrium with a low tax, low unemployment
and high search eﬀort, or an equilibrium with a high tax, high unemployment and low search eﬀort. Since
multiplicity of equilibria is not essential for our analysis, we rule it out.
14eﬀect depends on the balance between counteracting eﬀects. Moreover, it brings out that
the eﬀective job ﬁnding rates are the key transmission mechanisms. We have that it can











for i = u,a, z = pau,la (17)
Hence, we have that the wage eﬀect (∂α
∂w
∂w
∂z > 0 since ∂α
∂w < 0 and ∂w
∂z < 0, cf. Appen-
dix D) unambiguously increases the eﬀective job ﬁnding rate for both unemployed and
activated, whereas the direct search eﬀect as shown above is more complicated and de-
pends on the dimensions of workfare considered. The work requirement increases search
for unemployed but has an ambiguous eﬀect for the activated (see (8) and (9)), while
increasing the propensity of activation leads to more search for the unemployed and less
for the activated (see (10) and (11)). This also brings out why a focus on the direct search
eﬀect of workfare policies may miss an important element of why workfare policies aﬀect
labour market performance, namely the wage eﬀect.
The many counteracting search eﬀects of a marginal change in either of the two di-
mensions of workfare policies blur the fact that introduction of workfare elements in an
unemployment insurance scheme may contribute to lower both open and total unemploy-
ment. That is, if the unemployment insurance scheme does not have workfare elements,
there is an argument for introducing them if the aim is to lower unemployment under
a distributional constraint of given beneﬁts. To see this, we neutralize the unambigu-
ous wage eﬀect (assuming a constant wage) and consider search eﬀects only. It can be
shown (see Appendix E) that increasing the incidence of workfare (pau) leads to a fall
in unemployment, i.e. ∂u
∂pau
     
pau=0
< 0, and lowers total unemployment
∂(u+a)
∂pau
     
pau=0
< 0
provided that the workfare requirement is not too large, i.e. la < la. Similarly, increasing
the activity requirement from an initial level of zero leads to a decrease in unemployment
( ∂u
∂la
     
la=0
< 0) and an increase in the number of unemployed on workfare ( ∂a
∂la
     
la=0
> 0),
but an overall decrease in the fraction of non-employed (
∂(u+a)
∂la
     
la=0
< 0) provided that
the incidence of workfare is not too large, i.e. pau < pau. Note that these results indicate
that the overall eﬀects of changes in the elements of workfare depend critically on the
total policy package, that is, the incidence (pau) and the work requirement (la).
Finally, it may be questioned whether introduction of workfare policies is tantamount
to a two-tier beneﬁt scheme15 where there is a transition from a high (b) to a low (bL < b)
15Albrecht and Vroman (2005) show in a wage posting model how time-varying unemployment beneﬁts
15beneﬁt level since this will also induce an incentive eﬀect to search more actively for
jobs for those in the ﬁrst tier. It is relatively straightforward to show that there is no
equivalence between a workfare policy and a two-tier beneﬁt scheme16. The intuition is
that the two schemes will aﬀect utility and search incentives diﬀerently.
4 Numerical illustrations
To analyse how workfare policies aﬀect labour market performance, we provide in this
section numerical illustrations of the main eﬀects of variations in the two dimensions
of workfare policies. We report the results by means of simulations of the model. To
emphasize the wage eﬀect of workfare, we present the results allowing for a decomposition
between the total equilibrium eﬀect (termed the full model) and when the wage is kept
ﬁxed. This can be interpreted as a decomposition of the total equilibrium eﬀect into a
search and a wage component, cf. the eﬀects of workfare outlined above.
In the spirit of Frederiksson & Holmlund (2005), we let the instantaneous utility for
type i = e,u,a be given by
ui = lnci + lnfi
where c denotes consumption and f denotes leisure. Speciﬁcally, the utility functions for
the three types of agents amount to:
ue = lndw + ln(1 − le)
uu = lnλw + ln(1 − su)
ua = lnλw + ln(1 − sa − la).
can generate wage dispersion in equilibrium. This possibility does not arise in this setting with wages set
in a bargaining process.
16For this to be the case, the equilibrium attained for a given workfare policy (b,pau,la) should be
replicated for a scheme where there is a transition to a lower beneﬁt level (b, pau,bL). For this to be the
case, there are two conditions, namely that the utility levels should be the same under the two policies,
i.e.
g(b,1 − sa − la) = g(bL,1 − sa)
and the search eﬀort should be the same, requiring
v′
F(b,1 − sa − la) = v′
F(bL,1 − sa)
Clearly there is in general no level of bL satisfying both conditions.
16where d > 1 is a non-monetary return to employment. Unemployment insurance beneﬁts
are proportional to the wage17and represented by the replacement ratio λ < 1.
Again, following among others Frederiksson & Holmlund (2001, 2005), the matching
function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas of the form m = sηv1−η, with η = 0.5. Also, in
the tradition of the search literature, we impose the Hosios-condition (Hosio, 1990) and
set β = η = 0.5.
To match the features of the Danish labour market, we set public consumption,
r = 0.25, which corresponds to public expenditure of around 30% of GDP and the cost of
activating unemployed in workfare programmes, c = 0.025, which corresponds to around
3% af GDP. Unemployment insurance in Denmark is relatively generous, and to accom-
modate this, the replacement rate is set to λ = 0.6. We discount utility at ρ = 0.01
and assume that workers spend 60% of their time at work, le = 0.6. The exogenous exit
rate from employment, pue = 0.07, is set to ﬁt the unemployment rate at around 8% in
Denmark in the period before increased use of workfare programmes (see e.g. Andersen
& Svarer, 2007). Finally, output is set to y = 1, vacancy costs are set to k = 1 and d = 4.
We have conducted simulations for a wide range of parameter values, and the qual-
itative results are in most cases not dependent on the particular parameter choices. In
the following, it will be pointed out which results are robust to parameter variations and
which are sensitive.
4.1 Intensity of workfare (pua)
We start by considering the intensity of workfare, i.e. the probability by which unemployed
are required to participate in some activation measure to remain eligible for unemployment
beneﬁts. We assume for the moment that the workfare requirement corresponds to full
time employment (la = le = 0.6). In Figure 1, we show that there is both a locking-in
eﬀect, since activated spend less time searching for jobs than unemployed, and a threat
eﬀect, since the search activity for the unemployed increases in the workfare intensity.
Notice that in accordance with expression (11), the search intensity for the activated is
decreasing in workfare intensity due to the lower expected value of getting a job. Search
intensity is basically similar across the simulations with ﬁxed and ﬂexible wages, which
reﬂects that the replacement rate is constant. Lower wages and a higher search intensity
by the unemployed increase the incentive for employers to create jobs, and the vacancy
17In Denmark, beneﬁts are indexed to wages.
17rate increases. As the search intensities are basically unaﬀected by the wage drop, the
vacancy increase is accordingly mainly driven by the possibility for employers to earn
a higher proﬁt per vacancy since the wage cost is reduced (productivity of labour is
constant).
Figure 1: Eﬀect of workfare intensity on search, wages and vacancies



















































In Figure 2, we see that the increased number of vacancies lowers unemployment and
that the drop in unemployment is larger when the wage eﬀect is included. Not surprisingly,
the number of activated increases, and in the model without the wage eﬀect, it increases
even more. Considering total unemployment, we ﬁnd that increasing the intensity of
workfare from a low level will lower total unemployment, while at a high intensity, a
further increase may increase total unemployment marginally. That is, at a low intensity
of workfare the threat and wage eﬀects dominate, while at higher levels the locking-in
eﬀect dominates. Total search eﬀort decreases for the particular values of the parameters
applied. This ﬁnding could very well turn around if the workfare requirement was lowered,
giving the activated more time to search.
















































Note that since the wage decreases, it follows that the economic net-gain from ﬁnding a
job is reduced, and yet unemployment falls. The reason is that workfare makes claiming of
beneﬁts less attractive. Considering welfare, we have that the pay-oﬀs in all three labour
market states develop similarly; that is, the distributional proﬁle is not much changed, cf.
Figure 3.












19Finally, note that the locking in eﬀect of workfare on the search eﬀort of the activated
and the fact that more people are in activation are both poor indicators of the direction
in which unemployment (open and total) moves due to workfare policies. This in turn
points to the problems in assessing labour market policies from a partial perspective. The
same applies when relating total search to unemployment.
4.2 Work requirements in workfare (la)
In this section, the workfare intensity (pau) is ﬁxed at 0.46, and we show how increasing
the work requirement aﬀects various labour market outcomes. In Figure 4, it is shown that
increasing the workfare requirement lowers search activity for the activated due to the
locking-in eﬀect and increases the search intensity for the unemployed due to the threat
eﬀect. Whereas the latter eﬀect follows unambiguously from the model presented earlier,
the former could, for other parameter values, also be increasing. The deterioration of the
outside option of workers causes a reduction in the wage which induces more vacancies.
Figure 4: Eﬀects of workfare requirement on search intensity, wages and
vacancies






















































20As shown in Figure 5, the increase in vacancies alongside the more intensive search
eﬀort by the unemployed lowers open unemployment. For a ﬁxed wage, the number of
activated increases due to the locking-in eﬀect. With an endogenous wage, the number
in activation follows a U-path in the work requirement. This is the result of the locking-
in eﬀect tending to increase the number of activated and the improved return to search
due to lower unemployment. Hence, the job-creation eﬀect dominates for a low work
requirement, and the locking-in eﬀect dominates for a high work requirement.
Figure 5 also shows that the total search eﬀort is almost constant, reﬂecting that
search increases for unemployed (threat eﬀect) and decreases for the activated (locking-in
eﬀect). Vacancies are increasing in the work requirement due to the wage eﬀect. A higher
work requirement thus tends to lower unemployment via the threat and wage eﬀects,
and to increase it via the locking-in eﬀect (both less search and more in activation). In
general, a non-monotone relationship may arise, but for the particular parameter values
chosen here, we get that total unemployment is unambiguously decreasing in the work
requirement.



























































Again, the increasing workfare reduces welfare for agents in all three labour market
states. Compared to the situation with intensiﬁed workfare, increasing workfare require-
21ment is tougher for those in activation, leading to a non-proportional development in
welfare as workfare requirements are strengthened.



















As indicated above, workfare inﬂuences both the expected income and expected utility of
agents in the model. To summarize the main eﬀects, Figure 7 shows how mean income and
mean utility for workers are aﬀected as workfare is intensiﬁed. The mean income proﬁles
are basically ﬂat across both workfare intensity and workfare requirement, suggesting
that the eﬀects of the wage decrease are countered by the increase in employment. The
expected utility proﬁles are negatively sloped, suggesting that the transition of individuals
from unemployment to employment is not suﬃcient to counteract the drop in utility
that follows from intensiﬁed workfare. On the other hand, the negative eﬀect on utility
is smaller for the full model, where the vacancy eﬀect implies that fewer people are
unemployed. A direct consequence of Figure 7 is that employers beneﬁt from workfare
since the proﬁt share is increasing.





























































The present equilibrium search model has shown that workfare releases a locking-in, a
threat and a wage eﬀect; i.e. it aﬀects the position of all three groups in the labour
market (the activated, the unemployed and the employed). Empirical assessments of
workfare policies tend to focus on the search eﬀects for those in activation, but the present
analysis shows that the wage eﬀect is crucial for the eﬀects.
It was found that a change in workfare - both the intensity and the work requirement
- may shift the trade-oﬀ between insurance and incentives in the labour market. In the
analysis beneﬁts where kept constant18, and it was shown that workfare could be used
to improve the incentive structure, creating more jobs and lowering (open and total)
unemployment. It is also an implication of the analysis that partial results - theoretical
and empirical - of the eﬀects of workfare policies may be a poor metric for the overall
eﬀects due to the interplay between the three eﬀects of workfare policies.
Taking the simulations presented here at face value implies that policy makers wishing
to maximize GDP and hence minimize total unemployment should adopt intermediate
levels of workfare intensity but strict workfare requirements. Ignoring the wage eﬀect, the
18In the numerical analysis, the replacement rate is constant.
23suggestion would be to have relatively low intensity and low workfare requirement. It is
not surprising that including the wage eﬀects makes workfare more attractive. Whether
policies should be more strict in terms of workfare requirement than workfare intensity
is hard to generalize. It appears well established empirically that workfare has a strong
locking-in eﬀect ∂sa
∂la < 0 (see e.g. Heckman et al. (1999) and Kluve (2006)), and this
suggests that caution should be taken in terms of having too high workfare intensity.
Increasing workfare requirements can thus be suﬃcient to generate wage eﬀects, and
hence to increase job creation, and potentially to increase the eﬀective job ﬁnding rate,
leaving room for medium levels of workfare intensity.
An important topic for future research is to analyse the optimal design of workfare
policies and to compare it with other dimensions of labour market policies like time-
dependent beneﬁts, sanctions etc. A question which is complicated since it has to take
distributional concerns seriously. In this context, it would be interesting to include diﬀer-
ent types of workers with diﬀerent types of unemployment risks since this is an important
aspect for policy design.
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26Appendix
A: Utility gains
We have from (1), (2) and (3)












A) = h(w[1 − τ],1 − le) − g(b,1 − sa − la) + pue(V
U − V
E)
which can be written







































h(w[1 − τ],1 − le) − g(b,1 − su) +
pau[u(￿ w,1−le)−v(b,1−sa−la)]
ρ+αsa







h(w[1 − τ],1 − le) − g(b,1 − sa − la) −
pue[u(￿ w,1−le)−v(b,1−su)]
ρ+pue+pau+αsu




B: Marginal rates of substitution
Consider combinations of the transition probability (pau) and work requirement (la)
leaving the utility gain of employed relative to unemployed unchanged and the utility gain













= 0 = d(V
E − V
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F(b,1 − sa − la)
V U − V A < 0
Similarly, we have from (19)
 
pue (ρ + pue + pau + αsu) − puepau








F(b,1 − sa − la)dla +
pue
(ρ + pue + pau + αsu)
2 [h(w[1 − τ],1 − le) − g(b,1 − su)]dpau
 
(ρ + pue + αsu)(V
E − V
A) − [h(w[1 − τ],1 − le) − g(b,1 − su)]
  pue




F(b,1 − sa − la)dla
using that












(ρ + pue + αsu + pau)(V
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ρ + pue + pau + αsu
dpau = g
′




       
A
=
ρ + pue + pau + αsu
pue
g′
F(b,1 − sa − la)
V U − V A > 0
C: Impact eﬀects of changes in workfare policies
To see the eﬀects of workfare policies, it is useful to consider the impact eﬀects of
changes in the two elements of workfare, namely the transition probability (pau) and work
requirement (la) on the utility gains for given macro variables (w,α,τ). We have






















ρ + pue + pau + αsu
∂
 

























































The model can be summarized by the following 10 equations in the following endoge-





h(w[1 − τ],1 − le) − g(b,1 − su) + pau
 
V U − V A 


























[1 − u − a]pue = α(θ)[suu + saa] (24)
α(θ)saa = pauu (25)
Job creation and wage setting:
w =
 






uw(w(1 − τ),1 − le)


















Using (26), (28) and (29), we have




























30and using this in (20) and (21), it follows that utility gains can be written
V
E − V
U = F(w,τ,   α(w),pau,la)
V
E − V
A = G(w,τ,  α(w),pau,la)
Finally, the wage equation (26) can now be written
β
uw(w(1 − τ),1 − le)





0 = Ψ(w,τ,   q(w),V
E − V
U) Ψw < 0,ΨV E−V U < 0
= Ψ(w,τ,   q(w),F(w,τ,  α(w),pau,la)) (30)
For a given tax rate τ, the equilibrium wage is found as the solution to (30. If the function
Ψ is monotonously decreasing in the wage rate, it follows that the equilibrium is unique.
This implies that ∂w
∂pau < 0, ∂w
∂la < 0. Note that an equilibrium where 0 < u + a < 1
is ensured since if u + a = 0, we have u = a = 0, implying that   α(w) = pue which is
inconsistent with (29), and for u + a = 1, we have   α(w) = 0 which is also inconsistent
with (29).
Note that endogenizing the tax rate would introduce a non-linearity in the model
which potentially could imply multiple equilibria since
τ =
bu + (b + c)a + r
w(1 − u − a)
For this reason, the tax rate is assumed constant in the theoretical analysis, but the tax
rate is endogenized in the numerical examples.
E: Eﬀects of changes in workfare policies
In this appendix, we consider how changes in workfare policies (pau,la) aﬀect unem-
ployment (u), activation (a) and total unemployment (u + a).
We have from (12) and (13) that
[1 − u − a]pue = α[suu + saa]
αsaa = pauu
19Where Ψw follows from the second order condition.
31Hence,
0 = (pue + αsu)
∂u
∂z





















and it follows that
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αsa pau



























































∂z − [pue + αsu + pau]a∂αsa
∂z































(pue + αsu) +
pue+αsa
αsa pau
In the following, we consider the incremental introduction of workfare policies into a
beneﬁt scheme without workfare. We neutralize the unambiguous wage eﬀect and focus
on the search eﬀects which in general are ambiguous to show that they are unambiguous
for an incremental introduction of workfare. The question addressed is thus whether a
marginal introduction of workfare will lower unemployment (both open and total, i.e. u
and u+a) if starting with a beneﬁt scheme without workfare elements. This can happen
in one of two ways, either having an initial situation where (pau.la)=(0,la) and then
rising pau marginally, or having an initiation situation (pau,la)=(pau,0) and then rising la
marginally. The wage rate w and thus the job ﬁnding rate α are constant to focus on the
search eﬀect.
(I) Incidence of workfare










       
pau=0
= −(pue + αsa)
∂a
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= −
(pue + αsa) u
αsa + uα ∂su
∂pau





∂pau |pau=0 > 0 follows from (10).
∂(u + a)
∂pau
















Note that this is negative for la = 0, hence, there exists a la such that
∂(u+a)
∂pau




Note that if la = 0, agents are similarly situated as unemployed and in activation
(sa = su), and we have



































































αsa −1 > 0, and hence ∂u
∂la < 0 has as a suﬃcient condition α∂sa
∂la < 0. Note
that (8) implies that α∂sa
∂la < 0. For pau = 0, we have a = 0, and ∂u
∂la < 0 and ∂u
∂la + ∂a
∂la < 0.
Moreover, there is a pau such that for pau < pau, we have ∂u
∂la < 0 and ∂u
∂la + ∂a
∂la < 0.
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